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PROTECTING DEFENSE EVIDENCE FROM
PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY
RICHARD W. BECKLER*
FREDERICK ROBINSON**
WENDY SUE MORPHEW***
I. INTRODUCTION
In Jencks v. United States,1 the Supreme Court ruled that a federal
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to discovery of prior state-
ments of a government witness if those statements are related to the testi-
mony of the witness at trial. The Court based its ruling on the crucial
importance of such statements to the defendant's ability to impeach wit-
nesses effectively on cross-examination and to prepare his defense ade-
quately.2 As courts continued to grant criminal defendants greater
access to helpful evidence prior to trial,3 however, the government began
demanding equal treatment. Prosecutors argued that, aside from the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a defendant has no
valid interest in denying the prosecution access to evidence that could
throw light on the issues in a case-that the state has just as much right
to discovery of defense evidence as the defense has to discovery of evi-
dence in the hands of the state. Sensing a receptive attitude from the
legislatures and the courts, prosecutors argued further that the general
policy of wide-open discovery in civil cases should be equally applicable
to criminal trials.
It is now clear that the fifth amendment is not an absolute bar to crimi-
nal discovery in favor of the prosecution.4 For example, the Supreme
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1. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
2. Id. at 667, 668-69.
3. See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973) (insisting that discovery in a criminal
trial must be a "two-way street").
4. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970) ("Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege
entitles a defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before
announcing the nature of his defense.").
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Court has upheld, in the face of constitutional attack, the requirement
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1 that the defendant give
notice of an alibi defense.5 Likewise, Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 16(b) 6 compels a defendant who has asked for all discovery avail-
able to him under Rule 16(a)7 to produce to the government prior to trial
certain documents, test results, and tangible objects within his possession
and control that he plans to introduce as part of his evidence in chief.8
On the other hand, the language of Rule 16(b)(2)9 also "plainly evidences
5. Id. at 83 ("Privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by a requirement that the
defendant give notice of an alibi defense and disclose his alibi witnesses.").
6. Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, "Disclosure of Evidence by the
Defendant," reads as follows:
(1) Information Subject to Disclosure.
(A) Documents and Tangible Objects. If the defendant requests disclosure under
subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon compliance with such request by the
government, the defendant, on request of the government, shall permit the govern-
ment to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tan-
gible objects, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody,
or control of the defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence
in chief at the trial.
(B) Reports of Examinations and Tests. If the defendant requests disclosure under
subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon compliance with such request by the
government, the defendant, on request of the government, shall permit the govern-
ment to inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental
examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the partic-
ular case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendant, which
the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at the trial or which were
prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results
or reports relate to that witness' testimony.
(2) Information Not Subject To Disclosure. Except as to scientific or medical reports,
this subdivision does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or
other internal defense documents made by the defendant, or the defendant's attorneys or
agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case, or of statements made by
the defendant, or by government or defense witnesses, or by prospective government or
defense witnesses, to the defendant, the defendant's agents or attorneys.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
7. Rule 16(a) establishes what information the government must disclose upon the defendant's
request. Such information includes: (1) statements of the defendant; (2) the defendant's prior rec-
ord; (3) documents and tangible objects; and (4) reports of examinations and tests. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16(a).
8. See United States v. Ryan, 448 F. Supp. 810, 811 (S.D.N.Y.) ("Since the defendant has
availed himself of the strategy to obtain discovery of the government, he must comply with the
requirement for reciprocal discovery."), aff'd, 594 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
944 (1979); United States v. Whiteside, 391 F. Supp. 1385, 1389 (D. Del. 1975) (The court condi-
tioned the granting of discovery to the defense upon the defendant's permitting the government to
inspect and copy all documents or other tangible evidence the defendant intends to introduce at trial,
but also specified that "[tihe defendant need not comply with the government's request for produc-
tion if he elects to forego ... discovery.").
9. See supra note 6.
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that its purpose is not unlimited pretrial discovery by the prosecution
because it explicitly exempts from inspection by the prosecution 'reports,
memoranda, or other internal defense documents made by the defendant,
or [his] attorneys or agents in connection with the investigation or de-
fense of the case.' "1o
In recent years, prosecutors have gone to greater and greater lengths to
obtain one particular type of information from criminal defendants and
targets of criminal investigations: attorney work product. For example,
as a condition to settling a criminal case against a corporation, prosecu-
tors frequently ask the corporation to waive its attorney-client and work-
product privileges. A waiver permits the government to obtain internal
investigative reports and memoranda of employee interviews that prose-
cutors then can use to assist in the prosecution of corporate employees.
Similarly, grand jury subpoenas to attorneys have become increasingly
popular as prosecutors discover new ways of arguing that corporations
have waived their attorney-client privileges or that information corpora-
tions previously viewed as confidential is not in fact protected.
Fortunately, defense attorneys can employ certain strategies to bring
the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, and the Jencks
Act" limitations into play to protect the confidentiality of information
and evidence gathered by the defense. The remainder of this article out-
lines these strategies and explains how defense attorneys can implement
them most effectively.
II. PROTECTING AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
GENERATED BY INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS
In December 1988, lawyers for Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. were
locked in a heated battle with the Manhattan U.S. Attorney's Office over
whether a grand jury should have access to investigative information
compiled by Drexel's attorneys in preparation for Drexel's defense on
criminal charges of insider trading. In a decision that shocked the legal
community, Senior U.S. District Court Judge Edmund L. Palmieri al-
lowed a subpoena to be issued seeking both testimony and documents
10. United States v. Fratello, 44 F.R.D. 444, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11. With the passage of the Jencks Act, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (1957) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982)), Congress limited the government's disclosure obligations as
defined in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). See discussion of the Jencks Act, infra, at
notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
74 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
from Drexel's attorneys. 12 Judge Palmieri ruled that the requested infor-
mation was not protected by the attorney-client privilege because the
lawyers had used the information to assist Drexel's auditors in preparing
standard financial opinions regarding the company's potential liabili-
ties.13 Because the lawyers shared the results of their private investiga-
tion with the auditors, Judge Palmieri found that Drexel's lawyers had
waived the right to keep the information confidential. Had Judge Pal-
mieri's decision taken effect, the grand jury could have gained access not
only to the attorneys' files on Drexel, but also to any memoranda or com-
munications that Drexel's lawyers obtained from individual defendants
associated with the case, including Michael Milken, the renowned former
head of Drexel's high-risk, high-yield junk bond department. Drexel
eventually entered into a plea agreement with the U.S. Attorney in which
the government agreed to drop its demand for the information.
14
Although Drexel's lawyers ultimately managed to protect their files from
discovery, this incident highlights how careful defense counsel must be to
protect privileged information from disclosure to third parties. Internal
investigations, such as the one Drexel's lawyers conducted, have become
a standard response to allegations of corporate fraud or mismanagement.
Typically, the corporation's in-house counsel or retained outside counsel
conducts the internal investigation. The end result is usually a report of
the investigation, which then is circulated within the corporate hierar-
chy. Frequently, the corporation also shares the report's conclusions
with regulatory agencies or the corporation's auditors. Therein lies the
danger. That release of information may waive any applicable privileges,
including the attorney-client privilege, and create the risk that the infor-
mation ultimately will be discoverable by the prosecution. 5 Should such
12. Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1988, at B8, col. 3.
13. Id.; Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1988, at A3, col. 5.
14. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
15. The necessary requirements of the attorney-client privilege have long been recognized to
include:
(1) that there be a communication to or from an attorney;
(2) that the communication constitute legal advice or be made for the purpose of assisting
the attorney in formulating legal advice;
(3) that the confidentiality of the communication be maintained; and
(4) that the privilege not be waived in any manner.
See United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
Compare Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1981) (questionnaires completed by corpo-
rate employees pursuant to an internal investigation were protected under the attorney-client privi-
lege because they had been completed with the expectation of confidentiality and with the
understanding that they were solely for the purpose of providing the corporation with legal advice)
[Vol. 68:71
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reports indeed fall into a prosecutor's hands, the results can be truly dev-
astating because many reports are a virtual blueprint of the corporation's
potentially criminal conduct.
One possible solution is to counsel corporations not to conduct inter-
nal investigations; however, the pressure from shareholders, the media,
and regulatory agencies, such as the SEC and the Department of De-
fense, can create an intolerable atmosphere for a corporation that refuses
to investigate its own alleged improprieties. Another solution is never to
disclose such reports outside the corporate ranks for any purpose what-
soever, even to agents acting on the corporation's behalf. Such advice is
also rarely practical.1 6 Furthermore, when corporations generate inter-
nal reports pursuant to a voluntary compliance program, or need an
outside auditor's input to interpret the information, disclosure is inevita-
ble. Accordingly, while counsel is conducting an internal investigation,
she must utilize methods that will ensure the greatest possible protection
for client communications and attorney work product.
A. Prior Steps to Ensure Protection for Internal Corporate
Investigation Information
A defense attorney can take numerous steps to increase the probability
that the evidence he gathers cannot later be discovered by the prosecu-
tion. The following suggestions are based on factors courts previously
have cited in denying discovery of defense materials to the prosecution.
1. Undertaking the Internal Investigation Voluntarily
First, a corporation should make the decision to conduct an internal
investigation voluntarily, not pursuant to any government directive such
as a consent decree. When a corporation does not undertake an investi-
gation voluntarily, some courts have refused to apply the attorney-client
privilege to materials generated during the investigation, reasoning that
the corporation had not retained counsel to provide legal advice, but
with In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982) (a corporation's voluntary disclosure of
the results of an internal investigation to its independent auditors for the purpose of conducting an
annual audit, and to its underwriters for the purpose of facilitating a public offering waived the
attorney-client privilege as "the need for confidentiality served by the privilege is inconsistent with
such disclosure").
16. See ABA Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for
Information, 1 (1976) ("A lawyer should respond to the auditor's requests for information con-
cerning loss contingencies to the extent specified in the Statement of Policy.").
1990]
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merely to direct the investigation. 7
2. Specifying a Purpose of Obtaining Legal Advice
Before a corporation begins any internal investigation, its board of di-
rectors should pass a resolution clearly stating that the corporation has
retained legal counsel for the specific and sole purpose of providing legal
advice, and that counsel will conduct the investigation in furtherance of
that goal."8 The board's resolution also should direct counsel explicitly
to hold any information obtained in the strictest confidence and should
state that counsel will advise the employees that their comments will re-
main confidential. In this way, defense counsel can help ensure that the
government cannot claim later that the employees' communications are
not privileged because they were not made with the requisite expectation
of confidentiality.' 9
If the corporation chooses to conduct a preliminary investigation
before retaining outside counsel, in-house counsel, rather than other em-
ployees of the corporation who are not licensed attorneys, should con-
duct the preliminary, investigation. This precaution is designed to
support the argument in a later discovery fight that the investigation was
conducted for the purpose of rendering legal advice.
3. Special Rules for the Use of Outside Experts
If the corporation plans to consult outside accountants, auditors, in-
vestigators or other experts, the board's resolution also should state
plainly that these individuals will act under the attorney's direction and
control. Additionally, a written retainer agreement with outside consul-
tants should specify that they are being retained for the purpose of assist-
ing counsel in rendering legal advice. It is also suggested that outside
consultants be hired by the attorney instead of the corporation. This
17. See SEC v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594, 596 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Dresser
Indus., 453 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
993 (1980).
18. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Marc Rich & Co. A.G.), 731 F.2d 1032,
1037 (2d Cir. 1984) (the attorney-client privilege is "triggered only by a client's request for legal, as
contrasted with business, advice"); Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 375 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (the attorney-client privilege does not apply even though the corporation initiated the investi-
gation at the advice of counsel and kept counsel informed of developments, because the investigation
was essentially "management-oriented!' for overall business purposes and the lawyer-client relation-
ship was "merely tangential").
19. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 303, 394 (1981).
[Vol. 68:71
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shift will diminish markedly the government's opportunity to argue that
the consultants were hired to assist management, rather than to contrib-
ute to the provision of legal advice. However, the mere formality of be-
ing hired by an attorney does not guarantee that courts automatically
will consider subsequent communications between counsel and outside
experts privileged. In Federal Trade Commission v. TR W, Inc.,2° for ex-
ample, TRW's attorneys hired an outside firm to prepare a study in an-
ticipation of a substantial request for information by the FTC. The firm's
research proposal stated that it had been prepared for TRW's legal de-
partment, for the purpose of enabling that department to advise TRW on
the status of its procedures under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. De-
spite these precautions, the court strictly adhered to the established test
for privileged status-that the communication be made for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice-and ordered discovery of the documents. E1
B. Further Ways to Protect Against Future Discovery Once the
Investigation Has Begun
Once the corporation has retained counsel and a formal investigation
has begun, the defense attorney can take additional steps to protect the
forthcoming evidence from later discovery. The first precaution is so ob-
vious it is often overlooked. Counsel should mark clearly any documents
pertaining to the investigation with the words "privileged and confiden-
tial." In addition, notes and subsequent memoranda concerning inter-
views with employees or other witnesses should indicate who was present
during the interview and specify that the interview was conducted for the
purpose of providing legal advice. Counsel should not allow the presence
of other corporate personnel during the interview, as a court could find
such presence destroys the expectation of confidentiality and constitutes
a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 2 Counsel also should stress to
all persons involved in the fact-finding process that their input will be
used to render legal advice and that their comments will be held in the
20. 628 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
21. Id. at 212 (there must be "limitations on the protection accorded the work of third
persons").
22. See United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1989) (The presence of a third party at a
meeting between corporate management, employees and counsel destroyed any reasonable expecta-
tion in the employee that his communications were confidential); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d
641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Disclosures made in the presence of third parties may not be intended or
reasonably expected to remain confidential.").
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
78 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
strictest confidence.23
Whenever practical, a defense attorney should conduct interviews in
person. The use of questionnaires is discouraged because that format is
devoid of any of the factors that courts favor in granting protection from
discovery under the work product doctrine.24 If, however, the number of
individuals to be interviewed is so large as to necessitate the use of ques-
tionnaires, the least risky approach is to use written questions with boxes
for yes or no answers. That format will provide the government with the
least amount of information should it later obtain the questionnaires
through discovery. If the recipient of the questionnaire wishes to provide
additional explanation, the form should advise her to speak with the at-
torney directly.
Counsel should caution outside consultants and investigators that their
notes, reports, and memoranda also could be subject to discovery by the
prosecution, and thus should be drafted with the utmost care. Whenever
possible, outside consultants should report back orally to the attorney
before committing their comments to writing. After conferring with
counsel regarding the proposed content of their reports, the outside con-
sultants then should prepare an unsigned draft report. No final report
should circulate until counsel has approved it. An even better alternative
is for the lawyer to make his own notes based on the outside consultant's
oral report. Courts are more likely to accord protection under the work
product doctrine to the attorney's records than to an outside consultant's
written report.
Defense counsel should maintain all materials generated from an in-
vestigation in his personal files. In any event, the corporation should
never make such evidence part of its own files. Defense counsel should
keep the number of copies available to a minimum, preventing inadver-
tent disclosure that might lead a court to find a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege.25
23. See In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 91 F.R.D. 552, 556 (S.D. Tex.
1981) ("When the client is a corporation, the privilege extends to those communications to or from
the attorney by any employee if the communication concern[s] matters within the scope of the em-
ployee's corporate duties, the employee was aware he was being questioned in order that the corpo-
ration may obtain legal advice, and the communication was considered highly confidential when
made and has been kept confidential by the company.").
24. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979) (questionnaires
contain no mental processes of the attorney or other work product).
25. See United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464-65 (E.D. Mich. 1954)
(inadvertent or indiscriminate disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege); Eutectic Corp. v.
[Vol. 68:71
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C. Protecting Against Discovery After the Investigation Is Complete
Once the investigation is concluded, the single most important thing a
defense attorney can do to prevent eventual discovery of the investiga-
tion's findings is to ensure that the corporation refrains from disclosing
the information to any outside party for any purpose. Courts have con-
sistently held that such disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege be-
cause disclosure is inconsistent with the highly confidential relationship
protected by the privilege.26
Maintaining strict confidentiality is doubly necessary because any dis-
closure will waive the privilege not only for the final report of an investi-
gation, but also for the underlying information relied on in preparing the
report. For example, in In re John Doe Corp.,27 the Second Circuit al-
lowed production of all prior drafts of a voluntarily disclosed internal
corporate report, including those that mentioned criminal conduct.28 In
so ruling, the court rejected the corporation's argument that there had
been merely a limited waiver of the privilege through disclosure of only
the final draft, which did not include findings of misconduct. At least
one circuit, however, has applied a limited waiver in the belief that this
more liberal approach to the privilege will have the desirable effect of
encouraging corporations to police themselves and institute any neces-
sary reforms. 29 Nevertheless, given the conflicting decisions regarding
the limited waiver theory, a defense attorney cannot afford to take the
risk that his client will successfully retain any attorney-client privilege
Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (despite the fact that the original document was sent
to the attorney, the courtesy copy to the corporation's president was not privileged) (citing United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 193 F. Supp. 251, 253 (N.D.N.Y. 1960)).
26. See In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Fulbright & Jaworski), 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (litigants who fail to maintain absolute confidentiality are precluded from relying on the attor-
ney-client privilege); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (any
voluntary disclosure by the holder of the attorney-client privilege is inconsistent with the confidential
relationship the privilege is designed to protect and thus waives the privilege); In re Weiss, 596 F.2d
1185, 1186 (4th Cir. 1979) (documents and testimony previously provided to the SEC constituted a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege in subsequent grand jury testimony); In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 674-75 (D.C. Cir.) (inadvertent disclosure waives privilege),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979); United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (dis-
closure of attorney-client information in preindictment negotiations waives privilege).
27. 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982).
28. Id. at 489.
29. See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (voluntary disclosure
of privileged material in a nonpublic SEC investigation constituted only a limited waiver of the
attorney-client privilege); Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277, 284 (8th Cir.
1984) (reaffirming application of the limited waiver theory), cert. dismissed, 472 U.S. 1022 (1985).
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following even the slightest prior disclosure of an internal investigation.
Therefore, counsel should take care to ensure that no disclosure occurs.
III. PREVENTING DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM
EMPLOYEES OR OTHER WITNESSES
We now turn to the broader topic of how to prevent disclosure of state-
ments made by witnesses in interviews with a defense attorney during the
course of the attorney's investigation. While these suggestions will be
helpful to counsel seeking to prevent a prosecutor from gaining access to
employee statements given in the course of an internal corporate investi-
gation, they will prove equally valuable in denying the government dis-
covery under the Jencks Act of prior statements made by any type of
witness. Additionally, these suggestions will ensure that notes or memo-
randa prepared by defense counsel regarding those statements also re-
main privileged.
A. The Jencks Act Governs Disclosure of Prior Statements of Witnesses
Who Testify at Trial
Pursuant to the Jencks Act (the Act), defendants can discover prior
statements of witnesses testifying in a federal criminal trial.30 Congress
enacted the Act following the Supreme Court's decision in Jencks v.
United States31 that a federal criminal defendant is entitled to discovery
of prior statements of a government witness if those statements relate to
the witness' testimony at trial. The purpose behind the Court's ruling
was to enable the defendant effectively to impeach the witness on cross-
examination. In passing the Jencks Act, however, Congress moved
swiftly to limit the government's disclosure obligation to only those state-
ments that relate directly to a witness' actual testimony, and to preclude
defendants from obtaining those statements until after the witness has
testified on direct examination.
While some courts have concluded that a criminal defendant has no
reciprocal disclosure obligations under the Act,32 others have applied the
Act's disclosure obligation to the defense under a theory of reciprocal
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982). See supra note 11. The Jencks Act is implemented by rule 26.2 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
31. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
32. United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the Act by its express terms
"has no application whatever to defense witnesses and statements in the possession of the defense").
[Vol. 68:71
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discovery.33 Courts have not found the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to be implicated by these reciprocal obligations, known
as reverse Jencks Act disclosures, because that privilege "applies only to
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature obtained from the de-
fendant himself.",34
B. Types of Documents Discoverable by the Government Under
Reverse Jencks
The key to determining which documents the government can discover
under the Jencks Act lies in the statute's narrow and specific definition of
the term "statement."35 Under the Act, a "statement" can be either a
writing made by the witness and signed or otherwise adopted or ap-
proved by him,36 or a recording or transcription of a substantially verba-
tim recital of the witness' oral statement recorded contemporaneously
with the witness' declaration. 37  The entire declaration of the witness
must be included, not simply relevant excerpts, 38 and the document must
not contain any conscious or inadvertent opinions or impressions of the
person conducting the interview.39 Furthermore, "nothing in [the Act]
or in the cases construing its application ... justifies the conclusion that
[a party] can be forced to produce its entire files for inspection ... in
33. United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir.) (the purpose of the Jencks Act is to
"undergird the truth finding process" of criminal trials by making existing prior witness statements
equally available to both sides), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); United States v. Pulvirenti, 408 F.
Supp. 12, 14 (N.D. 11. 1976) ("The obligation placed on the defendant should be the reciprocal of
that placed upon the government.").
34. People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256, 261, 247 N.E.2d 651, 654, 299 N.Y.S.2d 830, 834 (1969)
(because the prosecution would be requesting statements of a witness offered by the defendant, rather
than the statements of the defendant himself, the privilege does not attach) (citing Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
35. The term "statement" is defined by the statute to include:
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or ap-
proved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other recording or a transcription thereof,
which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness
and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made by
said witness to a grand jury.
18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1982).
36. Id. § 3500(e)(1).
37. Id. § 3500(e)(2).
38. United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1292 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 934
(1977).
39. Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312, 316 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1029
(1969).
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order to determine if it contains some pertinent matter which might be of
assistance to the [other party]."'  Unless a statement clearly falls within
the stringent guidelines of the Act, the defendant need not produce it.
C. Using the Requirements of the Jencks Act to Prevent Discovery of
Notes of Witness Statements
1. Written Statements Must Be Signed or Otherwise Adopted or
Approved by the Witness
If the witness has not signed, adopted, or approved the statement, it
does not constitute a written statement within the meaning of the Act.4'
The witness' adoption or approval must be formal in nature. The re-
quirement is not met if the witness is unfamiliar with what the lawyer has
written down.42 Nor is it sufficient for the attorney in the course of the
interview merely to inquire of the witness whether the attorney has un-
derstood the witness correctly and for the witness to respond in the af-
firmative.43 Witness sheets prepared by counsel and containing
anticipated testimony that the witness has not signed or adopted also are
not producible under the Act."
2. Recorded Oral Statements Must Be Substantially Verbatim
Recitals
If the notes taken during the course of a witness interview are a "sub-
stantially verbatim recital" of what the witness has said, they constitute a
statement under the Act, and the defense must produce them upon de-
mand, providing they relate to the subject matter of the witness' testi-
mony.45 Because the Jencks Act was designed "to eliminate the danger
of distortion and misrepresentation inherent in a report which merely
selects portions ... from a lengthy oral recital," courts strictly construe
40. Foster v. United States, 308 F.2d 751, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1962).
41. United States v. Gantt, 617 F.2d 831, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
42. Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 110 n.19 (1976).
43. Id.
44. United States v. Myerson, 368 F.2d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991
(1967); United States v. Franzese, 321 F. Supp. 993, 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 995
(1971). Once a writing has been signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the witness, however, it
makes no difference that the lawyer and not the witness actually wrote the statement. Goldberg, 425
U.S. at 98.
45. Saunders v. United States, 316 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Whether or not the reports
are a substantially verbatim recital is a question of fact. United States v. Graves, 428 F.2d 196, 200
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970).
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the verbatim requirement.46 "Courts will not allow production of only
short excerpts of an interview."47 Instead, to be discoverable, the notes
must cover the entire interview.4" If the notes are a "truncated version,"
or if they constitute "merely a memorandum giving names, places and
hours," the court will deny production.4 9 The inclusion of selected ver-
batim phrases in an investigator's notes does not elevate the notes to a
Jencks Act statement." If the notes are anything less than a substan-
tially verbatim recital of the witness' remarks, they need not be produced
under the Act.
3. Rough Notes Are Not Subject to Production Under the Jencks
Act
To be producible as a substantially verbatim statement, notes cannot
be in rough or incomplete form.51 For example, the Supreme Court has
held that jotting down a couple of "rough pencil notes" giving "names,
places and hours" is not equivalent to recording the witness' words ver-
batim and is not sufficient to constitute a recorded statement. 2 More
recently, the Ninth Circuit refused to order production of rough, hand-
written notes used to prepare a formal interview report because such
notes were "too cryptic and incomplete to constitute the full statement
envisioned by the Jencks Act."53
Rough notes also will seldom qualify as Jencks Act statements because
an investigator rarely will read rough notes back to an interviewee. This
lack of feedback denies the witness the opportunity to adopt and approve
the statement. Unless the witness testifies that his interview was tran-
scribed verbatim into the investigator's or attorney's rough notes, or that
the notes were read back to him and approved, a court will not compel
discovery of the notes.54
46. See, ag., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352 (1959).
47. United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1292 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 934
(1977).
48. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 355 (1969).
49. See id.
50. United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408, 413 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
51. Augenblick, 393 U.S. at 355.
52. Id. at 354-55.
53. United States v. Griffin, 659 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949
(1982).
54. See id.
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4. Protecting Reports by Outside Consultants from Discovery Under
the Jencks Act
Investigative reports usually are not discoverable under the Act be-
cause they do not fall within the Act's definition of a statement. For
example, in Menendez v. United States,5" the Fifth Circuit held that a
report written from an FBI agent's notes of witness interviews did not
constitute a statement because the witnesses did not approve or adopt
either the report or the notes from which it was written. 6
Courts also have denied production of an investigative report when the
report does not include the prior statement of any witness who testified, 7
or is insufficiently connected with the subject matter of the witness' direct
examination. 8 Additionally, courts may deny production when only
half of the report consists of information elicited from the testifying wit-
ness and the other half is made up of information gleaned from other
sources. 9 Because this merging is common in report preparation, docu-
ments that convey considerable information beyond the witness' actual
comments are rarely producible under the Act. °
D. Summary of How To Protect Notes and Memoranda of Witness
Interviews from Discovery Under the Jencks Act
The legislative history of the Act makes clear that "one evil Congress
sought to remedy in passing the Jencks Act was the possible production
of notes made by... attorneys in preparing their case."' 61 Consequently,
55. 393 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1029 (1969).
56. Id. at 316. See also Hanks v. United States, 388 F.2d 171, 173 (10th Cir.) (the verbatim
requirement barred production of an investigator's report because the report contained only a de-
scription of the crime, the arrest, the personal and criminal history of the accused, a list of witnesses,
and a brief statement of the witnesses' expected testimony), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 863 (1968).
57. See United States v. Orzechowski, 547 F.2d 978, 985 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906
(1977). See also United States v. Pope, 415 F.2d 685, 689 (8th Cir. 1969) (reports of a postal inspec-
tor participating in a mail fraud investigation did not have to be produced because the postal inspec-
tor did not testify at trial and he had not adopted or approved the documents).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Graves, 428 F.2d 196, 200 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960
(1970).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Aviles, 315 F.2d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
906 (1965).
60. Of course, if the testifying witness was the author of the report, courts might be less likely
to rule that the inclusion of information from other sources should bar production. The witness
would still have to sign or otherwise adopt or approve the report, however, for it to be discoverable
as a Jencks Act statement.
61. United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 951 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984 (1962).
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the Act encompasses only those statements that record verbatim what
the witness has said, and requires that in order to be subject to produc-
tion, the statement must relate directly to the witness' testimony on di-
rect examination.62 The inclusion of extraneous material, such as
personal commentary by the attorney,63 or information from other
sources, 64 will prove fatal to production. In addition, a witness' written
statement is not discoverable unless the witness has signed or otherwise
adopted or approved it as his own.65
Therefore, in order to ensure that notes and memoranda relating to
witness preparation are secure from discovery, counsel should record
notes of the witness' statements in fragmentary form and intertwine them
with the attorney's impressions of the facts to such an extent that the two
cannot be separated. In addition, any attempt to have a witness verify
the accuracy of the attorney's notes should be oral and informal so that a
court cannot deem the exchange an adoption or approval of the notes by
the witness. Counsel should take only rough notes, and fragments are
preferable to complete sentences. Any subsequent interview memoranda
should await preparation in order to fail the Act's contemporaneous re-
cording requirement,66 and further make it appear that the attorney is
relying on his memory of what the witness said, rather than reconstruct-
ing the interview verbatim. 67 It also would be wise to rephrase the wit-
ness' actual words whenever it is possible to do so without losing the
original meaning. This will weaken the prosecution's claim that the doc-
ument contains a verbatim statement of the witness.6 8
Memoranda and reports are more secure from discovery than notes
taken during the interview because the former inevitably will contain in-
formation from other sources, and thus cannot be said to be solely the
verbatim statement of a witness. Memoranda also typically will contain
trial strategy that will cause the document to be protected under the
62. Saunders v. United States, 316 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
63. Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312, 316 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 934
(1969).
64. United States v. Aviles, 315 F.2d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 1963), cerL denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).
65. United States v. Gantt, 617 F.2d 831, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(2) (1982).
67. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1959) ("summaries ... which evidence
substantial selection of material, or were prepared after the interview without the aid of complete
notes, and hence rest on the memory of the agent are not to be produced").
68. United States v. Aviles, 315 F.2d 180, 192 (2d Cir. 1963) (discovery of an interview report
was denied because the witness had spoken in such poor English that the lawyer was forced to put
the witness' words "into a more recognizable form"), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).
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work product doctrine. Finally, whether the attorney is taking notes or
drafting memoranda, the less he writes about what a witness is specifi-
cally expected to say on direct examination, the less likely the document
will later qualify as a discoverable statement under the Jencks Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
Internal corporate investigations, such as the one conducted by Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc., have become a standard response to allegations
of corporate fraud or mismanagement. Unfortunately, these commend-
able attempts by corporations to put their own houses in order are in-
creasingly being turned against them in actions to impose both civil and
criminal liability on the organizations and their individual employees.
The innovative and aggressive tactics prosecutors now employ to obtain
internal investigative reports, memoranda of employee interviews, and
other forms of attorney work product, as well as to intrude upon the
attorney-client privilege, pose serious problems for defense attorneys. As
outlined in this Article, however, a defense lawyer can implement numer-
ous offensive strategies at each stage of the investigative process to ensure
that the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, and the
Jencks Act function as intended to protect the confidentiality of informa-
tion and evidence gathered by the defense. These recommendations are
well worth the time and effort they require, particularly when they suc-
ceed in preventing a virtual blueprint of possible corporate misconduct
from falling into the prosecution's hands. When such disclosure does
occur, the corporation in effect is forced to participate in proving its own
guilt. These steps will help insure against that situation.
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